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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the board structure of UK firms and the accuracy 
of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts with respect to information asymmetry and agency 
theory. We hypothesize that managers of firms complying with the recommendations of The 
Code of Best Practice may have “less to hide” and, subsequently, provide more information to 
outsiders (including analysts), thus facilitating more accurate analysts’ forecasts. We find that 
analysts are more optimistic, but less accurate, for firms with a greater proportion of non-
executive directors. This indicates that non-executive directors are inefficient at addressing the 
agency disclosure problem (at least in terms of the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts).  
 
JEL Classification: G14; G29; G34 
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1. Introduction 
The existence of the agency problem, generated by the separation of ownership and control in the 
modern corporation, has attracted considerable attention since the first half of the last century 
(Berle and Means, 1932). However, institutional steps toward developing potential solutions to 
this problem have only been taken in the UK in the aftermath of the “scandalous” collapse of 
several prominent companies during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most notably, financial 
reporting irregularities in the UK led to the establishment of the ‘Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance Committee’, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury; best known to academics and 
practitioners as the Cadbury Committee. 
 
In December 1992, the Cadbury Committee issued its first report, The Code of Best Practice 
(hereafter, The Code). This report consists of a set of recommendations on the structure and 
responsibilities of corporate boards of directors that ultimately were incorporated into the Listing 
Rules of the London Stock Exchange. One of the ultimate aims of The Code was to increase the  
openness and transparency of UK firms.1 Even if this aim has been achieved, the question still 
remains as to what governance mechanisms are more effective in accomplishing this  objective, 
and whether indeed the participants of financial markets, including analysts, benefited from these 
recent changes. 
 
The main purpose of the paper is to test the effectiveness of The Code’s recommendations at 
increasing the openness and transparency of UK firms, using as proxies for the latter the 
                                                 
1 According to The Code, “The [Cadbury] Committee’s objective [was] to help to raise the standards of corporate 
governance and the level of confidence in financial reporting and auditing”. It is argued that “openness on the 
part of companies, within the limits set by their competitive position, is the basis for the confidence which needs 
to exist between business and all those who have a stake in its success” (Cadbury, 1992, p. 15). In addition, it is 
pointed out that the responsibilities of the board of directors are to ensure and present “a balanced and 
understandable assessment of their company’s position ... aim[ing] for the highest level of disclosure” (p. 33).   
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accuracy of individual analyst forecasts, as measured by forecast error, dispersion and bias.2 In 
turn, the effectiveness of these recommendations regarding the composition of board structure is 
based on four main criteria; viz., the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the 
separation of the role of the chief executive and chairman (hereafter, duality), the chairman 
(executive/non-executive) mix, and the existence of a nomination committee. 
 
We argue that according to the information asymmetry and agency theories, there is a pertinent 
information gap between the insiders and outsiders of a firm (including analysts) and both parties 
are aware of this problem (Akerlof, 1972, and Jensen and Meckling, 1976).3 Consequently, 
individual analysts in most cases are not fully accurate in forecasting earnings for the firms they 
follow (i.e., they are biased and inefficient).4 However, taking into consideration the aims of the 
                                                 
2 There are essentially two reasons why we use the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for 
disclosure: (i) the crucial role of financial analysts in financial markets – their impact on the price of securities 
and investors’ perceptions about the future performance of a firm (Frankel, Kothari and Weber, 2006); and (ii) 
the limitations in the existing measures of the disclosure of a firm. Healy and Palepu (2001), for instance, argue 
that although there are significant advantages to the existing measures of the disclosure of a firm, such as 
management forecasts, analysts’ rating of disclosure, and self-constructed measures of disclosure, each of these 
approaches has its limitations. Mainly, management disclosure does not generalize to most forms of disclosure; 
analysts’ ratings of disclosure may be taken as a simple exercise, and the self-constructed measures of 
disclosures involves judgement on the part of the researcher and may be difficult to replicate. For these reasons, 
following Thomas (2002), we choose to use an alternative measure of a disclosure of a firm, viz., analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Although on most of the dimensions the latter is superior to the traditional measure of 
disclosure, it may depend on analysts’ abilities and available resources to perform the task. We overcome these 
drawbacks by controlling for analysts’ specific characteristics and the resources available to the brokerage firm 
that employs the analyst. Forecast error is measured as the absolute difference between the actual earnings 
announced by firm j in year t, and the forecast made by analyst i for firm j in year t. The dispersion of forecasts 
is computed as the standard deviation of individual forecasts made by analysts that follow firm j in year t. 
Finally, bias is defined as the difference between the actual earnings announced by firm j in year t and the 
forecast made by analyst i for firm j in year t. All three measures are standardised by the share price 5 days prior 
to the earnings announcement date and multiplied by 100. 
3  For the purpose of this paper, we base our arguments on agency theory. However, it should be noted that if one 
adopts the stewardship theory concept (i.e., that the managers are trustworthy and they act in the interests of 
shareholders) then the managerial control techniques would take the form of motivation mechanisms . 
4 Following the forecast rationality theory, we build our arguments based on two important properties of a 
forecast error, namely unbiasedness and efficiency of forecasts  (see Clements and Hendry, 1998). [It should be 
noted, that for the purpose of this paper, following the tradition in the field of analyst earnings forecasts, the 
directional measure of forecast error is called forecast bias, whereas the absolute value of forecast bias 
represents the forecast error] (see Table A). Let us assume that the forecast error, et, for a conditional 
expectation is et = At - E[AtôIt-h], where At is  the actual value known at time t and E[AtôIt-h] is  the expectation 
of At conditional upon the available information set It-h; h is the number of periods (h Î (1,…, k)).The forecast 
error, et, has two important properties: (1) Unbiasedness - since the forecast of At, made at t-h, is the conditional 
expectation of A forecasted at t-h, the conditional expectation of et should be zero: E[etôIt-h] = 0. [Note: this 
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Cadbury Committee, this information gap may be partly reduced as a result of the 
implementation of The Code’s recommendations. To examine this issue, with respect to the 
accuracy of individual earnings forecasts, we control for both firm-specific and analyst-specific 
characteristics via use of an analyst-firm fixed effects estimator. Such an estimator is necessary 
because of, at least, two layers of heterogeneity inherent in the data used. First, following the 
aims of The Code, it may be that the information environment of UK firms that have 
implemented these recommendations is richer compared to firms that did not do so – a feature 
that leads to heterogeneous information endowments across firms. And second, the forecasting 
abilities of analysts may differ from one analyst to another (Clement, 1999, and Bolliger, 2004). 
While these issues could also be partially ‘resolved’ by aggregating the data across firms and/or 
analysts, this would necessarily involve the disposal of potentially important information. 
Consequently, we maintain use of the richest possible dataset and tailor the estimation 
methodologies accordingly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
condition only applies under the assumption of a symmetric loss function. If an asymmetric loss function is 
employed by the forecaster, than it may be optimal for the forecaster to produce biased forecasts, see, for 
instance, Lim, 2001]; (2) Efficiency - et should be uncorrelated with any information available at the time of 
forecast, since, if this is not the case, forecasts could be improved by incorporating this correlation: E[et× It-hôIt-
h] = 0. Most studies in the field examine the quality of analyst earnings forecasts in terms of the validity of the 
above conditions, but without specifically pointing this out. For instance, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and 
Hussain (1996), amongst others, explore the over-reaction/under-reaction of financial analysts. In terms of the 
above conditions, these studies test the zero value condition of the forecast error et (i.e., first condition). With 
regards to the second condition, tests are often conducted by regressing the forecast error upon a set of variables 
that measure the information environment of a firm (i.e., disclosure score, size of the firm, leverage, etc). Under 
the null hypothesis of efficient forecasts, there should be no relationship found between the forecast error and 
any of the information set variables. By contrast, rejection of this null hypothesis implies that forecasts are 
conditionally inefficient and could be improved by incorporating this information into the forecasts. A similar 
approach to that described above is taken is this paper. However, we extend the efficiency testing in three 
important ways. First, in addition to tests of independence between directional measures of forecast error (i.e., 
the forecast bias) and the information environment of a firm, we consider tests of independence between 
measures of second moment-based measures of forecast error, such as the absolute forecast error and forecast 
dispersion. Though rejection of the latter type of independence does not imply forecast inefficiency, an 
examination of this relationship is important as it sheds light on the likely determinants of forecast accuracy. 
This represents the second innovation of the paper in terms of the efficiency tests performed. Finally, while 
previous studies of analyst forecast accuracy have largely relied on a narrow set of testing frameworks, we 
make use of a set of panel-based regression methodologies. As such, we minimise the chances of incorrectly 
rejecting null hypotheses due to model misspecification. 
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Our analysis yields several findings. First, we find that although analysts are more optimistic for 
firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the error and dispersion 
of forecasts for these firms are higher. Second, the forecasts made for firms with a combined 
leadership structure are more optimistic, though more dispersed. And finally the  chairman 
(executive/non-executive) mix and the existence of a nomination committee seem to have a 
negative but unstable effect on the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Overall, these results suggest 
that in most cases the recommendations of The Code are not effective at mitigating the agency 
disclosure problem, at least when using the accuracy of analyst forecasts as a proxy for 
disclosure. By contrast, it seems that these recommendations may actually have an adverse effect 
on the accuracy of analyst forecasts.  
 
The findings presented in the paper make a contribution to two different streams of literature; 
namely, the corporate governance and the analyst forecast literature. To the best of our 
knowledge, the research question posited in the paper has not been previously explored. As such, 
we make an innovative attempt at investigating whether differences in the quality of corporate 
governance adopted by UK firms are important to analysts in forecasting earnings. In this way, 
we address the question of whether the recommendations made by The Code are indeed effective 
in the context of analyst activity. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our hypotheses, and 
Section 3 explains the statistical models used in the study. Section 4 describes the sample and 
data, while Section 5 contains the empirical results. In Section 6 we conduct as series of 
sensitivity analyses and Section 7 concludes the study.    
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2. Hypotheses development 
 
In this section we discuss the potential associations between board characteristics and the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. For reasons of brevity, we henceforth refer to firms that comply 
with the recommendations of The Code (i.e., a greater proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board, separation of the role of the chairman and chief executive, a board chaired by a non-
executive director, and the existence of a nomination committee) as firms with a more 
independent board of directors.  
 
Following Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) we argue that board 
independence may help to reduce the agency disclosure problem through effective monitoring 
and stronger alignment of the agent and principal interests. In the presence of such monitoring 
mechanisms, managers’ actions are more aligned with shareholders’ interests; therefore they may 
have “less to hide”, thus providing more information to outsiders, including analysts. Assuming 
that the analyst’s objective function includes the accuracy of forecasts, then more independent 
boards may be associated with lower forecast error.5 
 
The effect of increased independence of the board on the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts may 
depend on whether the disagreement in forecasts is due to differences in available information or 
differences in forecasting models.6 With an increase in the independence of the board, a greater 
amount of firm-provided disclosure may be available to outsiders, including analysts. If analysts 
                                                 
5  However, contrary arguments may hold. For instance, recent studies find evidence consistent with managers 
taking actions to avoid negative “bad news” earning surprises. Matsumoto (2002) argues that managers can use 
two ways to avoid negative surprises: by managing earnings and/or by guiding forecasts. It may be that stronger 
governance impedes managers in their attempt to manipulate earnings. In addition, misleading earnings reports 
are easier to monitor (and prosecute) than misleading communication to analysts . Therefore, firms with a more 
independent board of directors may be associated with fewer cases of earning management, but greater efforts 
on the behalf of managers to manipulate analyst forecasts (i.e., higher forecast error).  
6 Lang and Lundholm (1996) use similar arguments in exploring the association between disclosure and the 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. 
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use a common forecasting model and possess the same firm-provided disclosure, but have 
different private information endowments (Barron et al., 2002), then an increase in the 
independence of the board may decrease the disagreement between analysts. This is because 
analysts may place less weight on their private information in the presence of increased firm-
provided disclosure. By contrast, if analysts use different forecasting models (Hong, Kubik and 
Solomon, 2000) and place different weight on components of firm-provided information, then 
greater board independence may actually increase the dispersion of individual analyst forecasts. 
In terms of forecast bias, previous findings  suggest, although not unanimously,  that board 
independence is positively associated with the value of the firm.7 Therefore, in the expectation of 
higher returns, analysts may be more optimistic (i.e., lower forecast bias) in producing forecasts 
for firms with more independent boards compared to firms with less independent boards. Below 
we discuss the potential association between the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and board 
characteristics considered in this study. 
 
2.1. The proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
 
There are a vast number of studies that explore the effectiveness of non-executive directors on 
the board of directors, yet, their findings are mixed. For instance, Bhagat and Black (2000) find 
no relation between board independence and four measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q, 
return-on-assets, market-adjusted stock returns and ratio of sales-to-assets). However, Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996), using a simultaneous equation framework, find a significant negative 
relation between outside membership on the board and firm performance. By contrast, findings 
presented by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) suggest that firms with a higher proportion of non-
executive directors enjoy lower bond yields and higher ratings on new bond issues. In addition, 
                                                 
7 See Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a survey of the corporate governance literature. 
 7 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006) document 
that firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors on the board have a lower cost of 
debt and a higher S&P credit rating, respectively.   
 
Similarly mixed, although much more scant, are the findings of studies that investigate the 
impact of non-executive directors on a firm’s level of disclosure. For instance, Forker (1992) 
using a sample of 182 UK firms and a self-constructed indicator of disclose during 1987-88, 
could not find any significant association between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
a firm’s level of disclosure.8 However, using more recent data and performing the analysis in the 
context of firms from Hong Kong, Chen and Jaggi (2000) find a significant positive association 
between the proportion of non-executive directors and disclosure. Based on this evidence, they 
argue that non-executive directors play a complementary role to disclosure.9 However, the 
results of another out-of-sample analysis performed by Eng and Mark (2003), suggest that a 
greater proportion of non-executive directors is associated with less disclosure on the 
Singaporean market. The authors argue that this may be due to the fact that non-executive 
directors are elected by block holders to represent their interests. As a result, they may be able to 
acquire the information directly, rather than through public disclosure. Eng and Mark (2003) 
conclude that non-executive directors in Singapore play a substitute-monitoring role to 
disclosure.  
 
Thus, the evidence regarding the role of non-executive directors in enhancing the information 
environment of a firm is mixed with only Forker (1992) addressing the issue in the UK context. 
Taking into consideration that for the purpose of this paper we use the accuracy of analyst 
                                                 
8  However, the author acknowledges as a limitation of his study the imprecision of corporate governance data. In 
particular, Forker (1992) points out that not all the firms in the sample that have non-executive directors 
disclosed them accurately in the financial statements.  
9  That is, an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors is complemented with an increase in disclosure. 
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forecasts as proxies for disclosure, the first of the main hypotheses tested in this paper can be 
formally stated as follows: 
 
H 10 : There is no relation between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and the 
accuracy of individual analysts’ forecasts. 
 
2.2. Duality, non-executive chairman and the existence of a nomination committee 
 
As in the case of non-executive directors, there is mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
separating the role of chairman and chief executive and having a non-executive chairman on the 
board. Imhoff (2003), for instance, holds that board effectiveness is severely compromised when 
the same person undertakes the role of the chief executive and chairman; and respectively, the 
board is chaired by an executive director. This is because the chairman, in most cases, sets the 
agenda of the board and, therefore, has an impact on the issues discussed at the board meetings. 
In addition, the chief executive that undertakes the roles of the chairman has a significant 
influence on the recruitment process of the new members of the board, thereby jeopardising the 
true independence of newly elected outside members of the board.  
 
Indeed, exploring market reaction to anti- takeover mechanisms, Coles and Hesterly (2000) 
document a more favourable share price reaction to the introduction of such mechanisms for 
firms with a dual (i.e., separate) leadership structure. Similarly, Asbaugh-Shaife et al. (2006) 
document that it is costly for firms, in terms of default risk, to cede too much board control to the 
chief executive. However, Brickley, Cole and Jarrel (1997) support the view that by separating 
the role of the chief executive and chairman, the company has the potential to reduce the agency 
cost of controlling the chief executive, but at the expense of adding to the agency costs of 
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controlling the chairman. They argue that unless the chairman has a significant ownership 
position, it is easier to control the chief executive whose reputation and financial capital are more 
at risk. More striking results are presented by Boyd (1995) who shows empirically that duality 
can actually lead to better performance. The potential advantage of having the same person 
occupy both positions is that they would exhibit a greater understanding and knowledge of the 
company’s operating environment. 
 
The director selection process has long been subject of criticisms as powerful chief executives, 
rather than shareholders, select directors. Such criticism has led to proposals that boards should 
choose directors through nominating committees composed only of independent members of the 
board. Indeed, The Code stresses the importance of transparency in the appointment procedure. 
Although obviously important, the adoption of a formal nomination committee on the boards of 
the UK firms has been much slower than other committees such as the audit and remuneration 
committees.10 Nevertheless, considering the aims of The Code, the existence of a nomination 
committee should increase the independence of the board by ensuring the appointment of 
directors whose interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In turn, this should contribute to 
an increase in the transparency and openness of the firms. Indeed, Shivdasani and Yermack 
(1999) document that when no nominating committee exists firms tend to appoint fewer 
independent outside directors on the board and more grey outsiders with conflict of interest. 
Similarly, Vafeas (1999) finds that the likelihood of using a nominating committee is positively 
(weakly) related to the independence of non-executive directors on the board. However, as 
argued earlier, duality may enable chief executives to exert a strong influence on all aspects of 
board work, including the nomination process.      
 
                                                 
10 In this study we concentrate on the nomination committee. This is because all firms in the sample had 
established audit and remuneration committees. 
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Thus, the recommendations of The Code may have, in practice, an opposite effect from that 
expected. In terms of our paper, this means that to the extent that the above discussed governance 
devices create pressure for better disclosure, it may be that analysts that follow firms that comply 
with the recommendations of The Code may produce more accurate forecasts compared to firms 
that do not comply with such recommendations. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the 
mixture of evidence regarding the effectiveness of these mechanisms, we do not exclude an 
insignificant or a negative effect of these governance mechanisms on the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts. Based on the above arguments, the next three main hypotheses tested in the paper can 
be formally stated as follows: 
 
H 20 : There is no relation between duality and the accuracy of individual analysts’ forecasts. 
H 30 : There is no relation between the chairman mix (i.e., executive/non-executive) and the 
accuracy of individual analysts’ forecasts. 
H 40 : There is no relation between having a nomination committee on the board and the accuracy 
of individual analysts’ forecasts. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1.  Evaluating the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
 
For the purpose of this paper, we use three different proxies to evaluate the accuracy of 
individual analysts’ forecasts: (i) forecast error, measured as the absolute difference between the 
actual earnings announced by firm j in year t, and the forecast made by analyst i for firm j in year 
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t; 11 (ii) forecast dispersion, computed as the standard deviation of individual forecasts made by 
analysts that follow firm j in year t; and (iii) forecast bias, defined as the difference between the 
actual earnings forecast announced by firm j in year t and the forecast made by analyst i for firm 
j in year t (i.e., optimistic versus pessimistic forecasts). In all three cases, in order to avoid any 
effects of information leakage, and following Thomas (2002), the measures of forecast accuracy 
are standardised by the share price five days prior to the earnings announcement date and 
multiplied by 100.12 Although bias is a sign version of error, it addresses the question of whether 
analysts are optimistic or pessimistic versus the magnitude of the error in the case of the forecast 
error.  
 
3.2.  The models  
 
Because of the potential collinearity problem between the proportion of non-executive directors, 
duality and the executive/non-executive chairman mix (see Table 4), we explore the impact of 
board related variables on the accuracy of analyst forecasts in distinct groups: (i) the proportion 
of non-executive directors and duality, and (ii) the executive/non-executive chairman mix and 
the existence of a nomination committee. Specifically, we consider the following models: 
 
Model 1: AFijt = a0 + a1NEDjt + a2DUALITYjt + a3HORIZONijt + a4LNMRKCAPjt + 
a5GROWTHjt + a6LOSSjt + a7LEVERAGEjt + nijt.                                                                                                   
 
Model 2: AFijt = a0 + a1EXCHAIRjt + a2NOMCOMjt + a3HORIZONijt + a4LNMRKCAPjt + 
a5GROWTHjt + a6LOSSjt + a7LEVERAGEjt + nijt.                                                                     
 
Model 3: AFijt = a0 + a1NEDjt + a2DUALITYjt + a3NOREVIEWijt + a4LNMRKCAPjt + 
a5ROASDjt + a6EXPijt  + a7EFFijt  + a8BRKSIZEijt  + nijt.                                                                                                          
 
                                                 
11  The absolute forecast error is chosen, as opposed to the squared error, as the former may be more representative 
of the loss function employed by analysts (see, for instance, Basu and Markov, 2004). 
12  The share price on the announcement day would be influenced by the earning surprise expectation, while the 
share price at the beginning of the year may be too removed from the event. 
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Model 4: AFijt = a0 + a1EXCHAIRjt + a2NOMCOMjt + a3NOREVIEWijt + a4LNMRKCAPjt + 
a5ROASDjt  + a6EXPijt  + a7EFFijt  + a8BRKSIZEijt  + nijt.                                                                                                          
 
Models 1 and 2 explore the association between board variables and the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts in the presence of firm-related variables; while Models 3 and 4 explore the association 
in the presence of both firm and analyst-specific variables.   
 
A description of the variables used in the models is given below: 
 
(i) Variables used to evaluate the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts 
AFijt – accuracy of individual forecasts made by analyst i for firm j in year t measured as: 
ERROR ijt = |Ajt – Fijt |/SPjt*100, where Ajt is the actual earnings reported by firm j in year t; Fijt is the 
earnings forecast made by analyst i that follows firm j in year t; and SPjt is the share price of firm j for year t 
five days prior to the earnings announcement date. 
DISPERSIONjt - dispersion of forecasts, calculated as the standard deviation of individual earnings forecasts 
divided by share price five days prior to the earnings announcement date for firm j in year t. 
BIASijt= (Ajt – Fijt )/SPjt*100, – similar to FEijt, but not in the absolute value. A negative BIAS indicates 
optimism, while a positive BIAS indicates pessimism. 
(ii) Variables used to evaluate the independence of the board of directors 
NEDjt - the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of firm j in year t. 
DUALITYjt - a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when the same person undertakes the role of chief 
executive and chairman on the board of firm j in year t, and zero otherwise. 
EXCHAIRjt - executive chairman - a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when the board of firm j in 
year t is chaired by an executive chairman, and zero otherwise.  
NOMCOM jt - a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when there is a nomination committee, and zero 
otherwise. 
(iii) Firm-specific control variables  
LNMRKCAPjt  - the natural logarithm of market capitalization of firm j in year t . 
ROASDjt  - the standard deviation of the return on assets over the last five years for firm j in year t. 
GROWTHjt  - a measure of the growth of firm j in year t (MRKCAPjt/MRKCAPjt-1). 
LOSSjt - a dummy variable that takes a value of unity when a firm’s earnings before interest and tax are 
negative, and zero otherwise for firm j in year t.  
LEVERAGE jt - the proportion of total debts against total assets for firm j in year t. 
 (iv) Analyst-specific control variables  
EFFijt - the effort put in by analyst i in following firm j in year t, calculated as the inverse proportion of the 
number of firms followed by analyst i in year t.  
EXPijt - years of experience of individual analyst i that follow firm j in year t, based on the assumption that 
1990 (the start year in our initial sample) is the year one of experience.  
BRKSIZEijt - the numb er of analysts that work for the brokerage houses that employ analyst i that follows 
firm j in year t. 
 (v) Forecast-specific control variables  
HORIZONijt - the average number of trading days between analyst’s  i earnings forecasts  announcement date 
and the reported date for firm j in year t. 
NOREVIEWijt - the average number of times the forecasts made by analyst i for firm j in year t is reviewed. 
?ijt - disturbance term. 
 
In order to address our research question, we adopt the following approach. First, a univariate 
analysis is performed aimed at comparing the differences in the mean (median) accuracy of 
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forecasts above and below the median of the independent variables.13 Then, given the nature of 
the research question (i.e., the estimation of the individual analyst’s forecast accuracy variables 
as functions of the relevant firm and analyst specific characteristics) and the complexity of the 
data employed, we use an analyst-firm fixed effects estimator.14 The variables, in this case, are 
adjusted, respectively, by analyst- firm specific means.15 Finally, following Clement (1999) and 
Bolliger (2004), we check the robustness of our findings using pooled and Fama-MacBeth 
regressions estimators.16 The approach used in this paper offers several benefits compared to 
using an aggregated forecast sample: (i) it offers the opportunity to test the hypotheses on a large 
sample of forecasts; (ii) it allows use of individual analysts’ characteristics without averaging 
across individuals; (iii) it explores the determinants of forecast accuracy across individual 
analysts in the presence of both firm and analyst-specific characteristics;17 and (iv) it avoids use 
of potentially inappropriate econometric techniques.18  
                                                 
13  A t-test is used to explore the differences in the mean accuracy of forecasts, and a Wilcoxon rank-sum test to 
evaluate the median differences. 
14  Due to the fact that each analyst in the sample may cover a (possibly time -varying) number of firms in any 
given year, and each firm may be covered by multiple (and a time -varying number of) analysts in any given 
year, the residual terms in a simple pooled regression may not be identically and independently distributed. 
Therefore, an analyst-firm fixed effects estimator is more appropriate. 
15  For example, the analyst-firm fixed effects estimator associated with Model 3 would take the following form: 
ERRORijt=f(NED¢ jt, DUALITY¢ jt, …, EFF¢ ijt, BRKSIZE¢ ijt), where NED¢ jt= NEDjt - ijNED , DUALITY¢ jt= 
DUALITYjt - ijDUALITY , EFF¢ ijt= EFFijt  - ijEFF , BRKSIZE¢ ijt = BRKSIZEijt  - ijBRKSIZE  (Greene, 1997). 
Moreover, in order to address the potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems that may be inherent 
in the nature of the data used (Cohen and Lys, 2003), the t(z)-values are calculated using the White-estimator of 
the variance-covariance matrix (White, 1980).  
16  The advantage of this  approach is two-fold. Firstly, estimating the regression equation on an annual basis 
addresses the potential serial correlation problem in the data. Secondly, the time -series pattern of the 
coefficients may be informative (see Clement, 1999, and Bolliger, 2004). 
17 Some of the firm-specific characteristics employed in the research are dummy variables (e.g., duality, 
executive/non-executive chairman, the presence of a nomination committee). This feature is not unique to our 
research. For instance, Clement (1999) and Bolliger (2004) also employ dummy variables to measure the status 
of the brokerage house an analyst works for in their research. The variability across years within the firm 
dimension of these variables should ensure the sensitivity of the fixed-effects estimator to these changes. In the 
case of our research, there are 2488 individual forecasts when the nomination committee for firm j switches 
from 0 to 1, 1978 forecasts for executive/non-executive chairman, and 579 forecasts for duality. The variability 
of these variables would ensure the sensitivity of the analyst-firm fixed effects estimator to these variables. 
18  Exploring the impact of analyst-specific characteristics only on individual analysts’ forecast errors, Cle ment 
(1999) and Bolliger (2004) employ a firm-year fixed effects estimator. However, a distinctive characteristic of 
our research is that unlike the above studies , we explore the impact of both firm and analyst-specific 
characteristics on the accuracy of individual analyst forecasts. De-meaning the variables by the firm-year values 
would remove the impact of firm-specific variables. Therefore, a combined analyst-firm fixed effects estimator 
is used. 
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4. Sample Data 
 
The initial sample of one year ahead individual analysts’ earnings forecasts is drawn from the 
I/B/E/S UK Detailed File. It consists of 263,350 earnings forecasts made from January 1990 
through December 2002. Despite its overall quality, the I/B/E/S database does contain a number 
of omissions and inconsistencies. Therefore, to proceed further, we eliminate observations with 
unidentified analyst codes, missing reported dates and actual earning per share values (see details 
in Table 1, Panel A).  Previous evidence suggests that the information environment of a firm is 
richer closer to the announcement date of annual earnings and that the most recent forecasts are 
the most accurate ones.19 For these reasons, forecasts very near the end of the forecasting period 
are attractive measures for assessing differences in the accuracy of forecasts across firms. After 
selecting the most recent forecasts made by a particular analyst for a particular firm, the size of 
the sample is reduced to 59,410 forecasts (Table 1, Panel B).20  
 
The firm-specific financial information was mainly collected from Datastream and supplemented 
with information regarding board characteristics from Annual Reports. After eliminating the 
observations not available in Datastream, forecasts made for financial firms, and forecasts 
qualified as outliers, the dataset contains 27,350 individual analyst forecasts.21 In addition, due to 
the specific nature of the analyst- firm fixed effects estimator, we require that each analyst in the 
sample should follow a firm for at least three years.22 The final sample is comprised of 11,659 
forecasts made for 532 firms by 488 analysts over a 6 year period. The three dimensional 
                                                 
19 See, for instance, Clement (1999). 
20 Although we restrict our sample to the most recent forecasts, we take into consideration the total number of 
forecasts by using the number of reviews of a particular forecast as a control variable (NOREVIEW).   
21  Following Thomas (2002), observations that have a forecast error greater than the associated share price and 
dispersion of forecasts greater than twenty percent are treated as outliers. There are 45 forecast error-related 
outliers and 99 dispersion-related outliers. 
22  This requirement is imposed for two main reasons. First, to exclude the forecasts made by non-active analysts. 
And second, to allow the calculation of meaningful analyst-firm means for analyst and firm-specific variables 
(see, for instance, Himmerberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999). 
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variation of the dependent variables (i.e., analyst, firm and time) requires use of appropriate 
econometric techniques. However, the rigorous selection criteria used to shape the sample and 
the elimination of forecast data due to missing values in the initial dataset, does create the 
potential for selection bias. Using Verbeek and Nijman’s (1992) methodology, however, the 
existence of a selection bias problem is rejected.23 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. The mean (median) 
market capitalisation of firms included in the sample is £4.81 billion (£978 million), with a 
maximum of £172 billion and a minimum of £2.79 million. The average firm in the sample has 
24.5 pence worth of total debts per pound of total assets, and a growth rate of 10.4 percent over 
the period 1996 to 2002.  
 
The board of directors of an average firm in the sample is comprised of 9 members. Non-
executive directors remain in the minority on UK boards, with the average representation in our 
sample being 48.7%. The incidence of duality is relatively low, with 8% of the forecasts in the 
sample being made for firms that have a combined role of chairman and chief executive. The 
results indicate that the majority of forecasts included in the sample (78%) are made for firms 
                                                 
23 Following Verbeek and Nijman (1992), we create a dummy variable rijt that denotes whether or not observations 
for yijt are available. In other words, rijt=1 if yijt is observed, and rijt =0 otherwise. The condition of consistency is 
that the error term should not depend on rijt. More formally, E[ ijte
~ | rijt]=0, where i=1…N , j=1…M, t=1…T, and 
ijte
~  is  the residual. The authors argue that one could create functions of rijt, like rijt-1, cij=Õ =
T
s ijs
r
1
 or 
Tij=å =
T
s ijs
r
1
, indicating whether j was observed by i in the previous year, over all the periods, and the total 
number of periods j is observed by i, respectively. In order to check for selection bias, Verbeek and Nijman 
(1992) suggest to include these function of rijt in the model and to check their significance. The results of this 
study (available upon request) indicate that the sample used in the research does not suffer from selection bias. 
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that have established a nomination committee. At the same time, in 39% of the cases, the board 
is chaired by an executive  chairman. UK analysts appear to be reasonably accurate at forecasting 
short-term earnings, as reflected in a median forecast error and dispersion of forecasts of 0.467% 
and 0.400%, respectively. An average analyst in the sample has 4.42 years of experience, 
following an average of 11.63 firms per year.24 Moreover, analysts in our sample review a 
forecast 2.82 times, and the average age of a forecast in the sample is 152 trading days.  
 
5.2. Univariate analysis 
 
Table 3 reports the differences in the mean/median of the accuracy of analyst forecasts for 
observations above and below the median of the independent variables.25 The results suggest that 
contrary to the recommendations of The Code, analysts are less accurate for firms with a greater 
proportion of non-executive directors. For instance, the mean forecast error of firms with a small 
proportion of non-executive directors is 1.386%, compared to 2.403% of firms with a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors, with the difference being significant at the 1% level.  
 
Also contrary to the recommendations of The Code, the univariate analysis indicates that firms 
with a combined leadership structure and firms chaired by an executive chairman have a lower 
forecast error and dispersion. Thus, the preliminary evidence does not provide any support for 
the recommendations of The Code. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24  Analyst effort is measured as the inverse of the number of firms followed by analyst i for firm j in year t (Table 
A). This means in this particular case: 1/0.086=11.63 firms. 
25  For the dummy variables used in the model, such as duality, executive/non-executive chairman, the existence of 
a nomination committee and loss firms, instead of using the median as the cut off point, we group them based 
on the value of dummies (i.e., 0 or 1). 
 17 
5.3.  Multivariate analysis 
 
In this section we discuss the results of the analysis as hypothesised in Section 2, with the results 
pertaining to forecast error given in Table 5, dispersion in Table 6, and forecast bias in Table 7. 
Each of these tables contains the results of the three estimation techniques described earlier, 
namely the analyst- firm fixed effects, pooled and Fama-MacBeth regressions estimators. For 
reasons of brevity, we mainly focus on the results obtained from the analyst-firm fixed effects 
estimator.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-executive directors. Contrary to the recommendations of The Code, the 
results in Table 5 suggest that with an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors, 
analyst forecast error increases. In particular, in the context of Model 1, a one unit increase in the 
proportion of non-executive directors, ceteris paribus, increases the forecast error by 2.977%. A 
qualitatively similar conclus ion can be drawn using the pooled and Fama-MacBeth regressions 
estimators across all the models (Table 5). Moreover, firms with a greater proportion of non-
executive directors not only have a greater forecast error, but their forecast dispersion is also 
greater. The results in Table 6 suggest that the proportion of non-executive directors is positively 
(but not across all the models significantly) associated with dispersion. For instance, using 
Model 1 and the analyst- firm fixed effects estimator, we find that a unit increase in the 
proportion of non-executive directors, ceteris paribus, is associated with 1.035% greater 
dispersion of forecasts. Thus, with an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors, the 
level of disagreement between the analysts regarding the future prospects of a firm increases.  
Some analysts, following the recommendations of The Code, may have higher expectations 
regarding the future earnings of the firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors. 
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Others, however, who take into consideration the critical views regarding the effectiveness of 
non-executive directors, may be less so inclined.  
 
Thus, in line with the information asymmetry and agency theories, the above evidence suggests 
that there is an agency information problem between the insiders and outsiders of a firm. 
However, contrary to the expectations and recommendations of The Code, an increase in the 
proportion of non-executive directors seems to be an inefficient method of addressing the agency 
disclosure problem, at least in terms of the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts. Indeed, 
increasing the proportion of non-executive directors actually seems to accentuate the problem. 
These findings are in direct contrast to the complementary role to disclosure attributed to non-
executive directors in Hong Kong by Chen and Jaggi (2000). However, our findings support Eng 
and Mark’s (2003) substitute-monitoring role to disclosure of non-executive directors. A 
possible explanation may be that the non-executive directors are elected by institutional investors 
or block holders to represent their interests. As a result, non-executive directors may obtain the 
necessary information directly, rather than through public disclosure. The bottom line is that, 
contrary to the expectation of The Code, the non-executive directors seem not to fulfil their role 
of increasing the openness and transparency of UK firms. As a result of lower disclosure for 
firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors, individual analysts make forecasts 
that suffer from higher forecast error and dispersion. 
 
Despite the substitute-monitoring role of non-executive directors, the results presented in Table 7 
suggest that analysts are more optimistic for firms with a greater proportion of non-executive 
directors.  In the context of the analyst-firm fixed effects estimator and Model 1, a one unit 
increase in the proportion of non-executive directors, ceteris paribus, is associated with 3.876% 
lower forecast bias (i.e., greater optimism). A possible explanation for these results may be that 
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analysts expect non-executive directors to perform effectively their monitoring activities (i.e., 
greater expected returns for firms with more independent boards). Alternatively, this may be 
because of the greater level of uncertainty associated with these firms (i.e., lower disclosure, as 
argued earlier, may be associated with higher uncertainty and, thus, greater optimism; see 
Scherbina, 2004). In terms of forecasting theory, the findings suggest that UK analysts are biased 
and inefficient at producing earnings forecasts. In particular, the forecast bias of UK analysts is 
different from zero (i.e., the condition of forecast unbiasedness is not met) and the forecast bias 
depends on firm-specific characteristics (i.e., the efficiency condition is violated). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Duality. The results suggest that a combined leadership structure does not affect 
analyst forecast error, but it has a weak impact on the dispersion and bias of the forecasts. For 
instance, the results in Table 6 and 7 (Model 1) suggest, ceteris paribus, tha t analysts are on 
average 0.303% more optimistic and the forecasts are 0.221% less dispersed for firms with a 
combined leadership structure compared to firms with no duality. This evidence does not support 
the recommendations of The Code, which suggests that duality is not a recommended practice. 
By contrast, our results seem to suggest that analysts take Boyd’s (1995) point of view that 
duality may have a positive effect on the performance of the firm. In addition, it seems that firms 
with a combined leadership structure provide more information to outsiders – a feature that 
results in less dispersed forecasts.  
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4: Executive/non-executive chairman and a nomination committee. Further 
results (Model 3 and 4) suggest that the role of a chairman and the existence of a nomination 
committee seem to have an insignificant impact on the forecast error and bias (Table 5 and 7). 
However, there is a weak indication (Table 6) that the role of chairman and the existence of a 
nomination committee affect the level of disagreement between analysts. Specifically, as based 
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on Model 3, the forecasts made for firms with a non-executive chairman and/or a nomination 
committee, ceteris paribus, are, on average, 0.216% and 0.125%, respectively, more dispersed 
compared to forecasts made for firms with an executive chairman and/or a nomination 
committee. However, in both cases the results are not robust across the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions estimator.  
 
Thus, cont rary to the recommendations of The Code, the evidence suggests that a non-executive 
chairman and the existence of a nomination committee seem to have a very weak (or no) impact 
on the level of disagreement between analysts. It may be that, similar to the non-executive 
directors, the non-executive chairman acts as a substitute-mechanism to disclosure. The rationale 
of forming a nomination committee is to ensure a formal and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors on the board.  However, because of the lack of robustness of the 
results, the evidence should be treated with some caution.  
 
In terms of the control variables, the results presented in this paper support previous evidence 
that, nearer to the earnings announcement date, forecast errors and the analysts’ level of 
optimism decrease. In addition, more experienced analysts are found to make more optimistic, 
but less accurate forecasters.  
 
6. Sensitivity tests  
 
The main aim of this paper is to test whether the openness and transparency of a firm improves 
with an increase in the independence of the board, using the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts as a 
proxy for disclosure. In this section, we further examine this association by considering its 
relationship with the ownership structure of a firm and research and development expenditures.  
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Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest, and The Code reinforces the view,  that non-executive directors 
strengthen the extent to which a board is independent of company management and so improve 
the degree of board monitoring. However, there are concerns that under concentrated director 
ownership, the controlling owners may have significant voting power and influence to determine 
the composition of the board and the appointment of non-executive directors (see, for instance, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Therefore, it may be that non-executive directors of high- insider 
ownership firms may be less effective at addressing the agency disclosure problem compared to 
non-executive directors of firms with less concentrated insider ownership. Indeed, Leung and 
Horwitz (2004) find that non-executive directors in Hong Kong are more effective at enhancing 
voluntary disclosure for firms with low insider ownership structure only. In order to check this 
possibility we proceed as follows. We create an interaction term between the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board (NED) and a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the 
proportion of shares held by insider members of the board as a proportion of outstanding shares 
is greater than the median, and zero otherwise (DINSOW). Then we include the interaction term 
in Model 1 and use an analyst- firm fixed effects estimator. Upon doing this (Table 8), we 
confirm our previous results that analysts are more optimistic, but less accurate, for firms with a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors, this holding true for both low and high insider 
ownership firms. Although analysts that follow high insider ownership firms are more accurate 
and but less optimistic with an increase in the proportion of non-executive directors compared to 
low insider ownership firms, the sum of the coefficients on NED and NEDxDINSOW is positive 
for forecast error and dispersion, and negative for bias (i.e., more optimistic forecasts). Thus, 
contrary to the evidence presented by Leung and Horwitz (2004), our results suggest that high 
insider ownership does not reduce the information environment of a firm, as measured by the 
accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.  
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As argued earlier in the paper, previous evidence suggests that firms with more independent 
boards of directors are more likely to enjoy superior performance and firm value. As such, the 
latter firms may be in a better position to “afford” higher research and development  
expenditures. As documented by Kothari, Laguerre and Leone (2002) and Amir, Guan and Livne 
(2007), research and development expenditures are associated with higher future uncertainty. 
Consequently, it may be that although firms with more independent boards of directors are more 
transparent, this effect may be crowded out by the greater uncertainty related to these financial 
items. As a result, financial analysts may be less accurate for firms with high research and 
development expenditures compared to firms with less such expenditures. To address the issue, 
we create two dummy variables for firms with high and low research and development 
expenditures (DR&DH and DR&DL). If the amount of research and development expenditures 
as a proportion of sales is higher (lower) than the median, DR&DH (DR&DL) takes a value of 
unity, and zero otherwise.26  Then we include the interactive terms of these variables with the 
proportion of non-executive directors in Model 1. The results presented in Table 8 support our 
previous findings that a greater proportion of non-executive directors is indeed associated with 
more optimistic, but less accurate forecasts, for both high and low research and development 
firms.27 Nonetheless, analysts seem to be less optimistic and make a lower forecast error, for 
firms with lower research and development expenditures that increase the proportion of non-
executive directors compared to high research and development firms. However, the sum of the 
coefficients, in both cases, confirm our initial findings that analysts are more optimistic, but less 
accurate, for firms with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board. These 
                                                 
26  It should be noted that firms that report zero research and development expenditures, or do not report any such 
expenditures, are not included in the low research and development category.  
27  The results hold true in the presence of both ownership and research and development expenditures in the same 
model. 
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results hold true for firms with different levels of insider ownership and research and 
development expenditures.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions  
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that as predicted by the information asymmetry 
and agency theories, there is an agency disclosure problem between the ins iders and outsiders of 
a firm. Despite The Code recommending a set of governance mechanisms aimed at addressing 
this issue, the findings in this paper suggest that in most cases these recommendations are not 
effective at mitigating the agency disclosure problem, at least when using the accuracy of analyst 
earnings forecasts as a proxy for the disclosure of a firm. The above findings, in the context of 
standard forecasting theory, suggest that analysts are biased and inefficient at forecasting 
earnings.  
 
Moreover, the results suggest that, in some instances, the recommendations of The Code may 
actually have an adverse effect on disclosure. For instance, we find that although analysts’ are 
more optimistic for firms with a greater proportion of non-executive directors on the board, the 
forecast error and dispersion for these firms is higher, this holding true at different levels of 
insider ownership and research and development expenditures. Thus, although analysts view 
non-executive directors as a desirable characteristic of a board (i.e., analysts are optimistic), in 
reality non-executive directors seem to be ineffective at increasing the transparency of the firm.  
In line with Eng and Mark (2003), we argue that non-executive directors play a substitute-
monitoring role to disclosure. It is possible that non-executive directors have been elected on the 
board by the major institutional shareholders or other block holders. As a result, they obtain their 
information directly and not from public disclosure. 
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Duality is found to have an insignificant influence on forecast error, though the forecasts made 
for firms with a combined leadership structure are more optimistic and dispersed. This evidence 
suggests that duality may foster stronger leadership, rather than a situation where the chief 
executive /chairman acts to the detriment of shareholders. In addition, the chairman 
(executive/non-executive) mix and the existence of a nomination committee do not seem to 
affect the forecast error and bias. However, the forecasts made for these firms are found to be 
more dispersed. It may be that some analysts view non-executive chairmen to be too busy to 
perform effectively their duties, furthermore that they could use their strong external connections 
to the detriment of shareholders’ interests. Others, however, who take into consideration the 
recommendations of The Code, may take a positive view regarding the role of the non-executive 
chairmen – a view that results in higher disagreement between individual analysts’ regarding 
future earnings.     
 
In summary, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that the recommended governance 
practices, as in The Code, seem to be ineffective at addressing the agency disclosure problem, at 
least when using the accuracy of analyst forecasts as a proxy for disclosure. Indeed, in some 
cases they actually have the opposite effect from that intended. These results compound previous 
suggestions that question the effectiveness of the recommended governance practices. However, 
the current research approaches the issue from a different perspective (i.e., analyst perspective), 
using panel data techniques and a UK sample. To the best of our knowledge these are innovative 
insights into analysts’ forecasting activity from a corporate governance perspective. 
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Table 1. Sample selection. 
 
Panel A. We start with a total of 263,350 one-year ahead earning forecasts available in the I/B/E/S UK Detailed File 
made by the financial analysts during the 1990-2002 period. The observations that have missing I/B/E/S-specific 
characteristics, such as reported date, analyst code and actual earning per share, are eliminated from the sample. 
After eliminating these forecasts, the sample is comprised of 151,212 individual forecasts, but which also include 
the revised forecasts. For instance, if analyst i follows firm j in year t and the forecast has been reviewed five times 
since it has been initially made to the announcement date, then all five forecasts would be included in the samp le. 
 
 Individual 
forecasts  
Firm-year 
forecasts  
Firms  Brokerage 
houses  
Analysts 
UK EPS forecasts  
 
263,350 14,634 1,869 179 1,813 
After eliminating 
observations with missing  
     
Reported date 207,770 11,703 1,773 160 1,730 
 
Analyst code 161,982 10,532 1,704 138 1,729 
 
Actual EPS 
 
155,346 8,936 1,596 130 1,718 
 
Different year-firm actual 
EPS value 
151,212 8,775 1,585 128 1,713 
 
 
Panel B. For the purpose of this paper, from the 151,212 forecasts we select the most recent forecasts made by 
analyst i for firm j in year t. This yields a sample of 59,410 individual forecasts. Then we eliminate forecasts made 
for firms not available in Datastream, financial firms  and firms with no found annual reports. In addition, because of 
the small number of forecasts in the sample made during 1990-1995&2002 we also eliminate these forecasts. Due to 
the specific nature of the employed methodology to explore the individual analysts forecasts, we require that 
forecasts included in the sample should be made by analysts that follow a particular firm for at least three years. This 
requirement yields a sample of 11,659 individual analyst forecasts. 
 
 Individual 
forecasts  
Firm-year 
forecasts  
Firms  Brokerage 
houses  
Analysts  
The most recent forecasts  59,410 8,775 1,585 128 1,713 
 
Available in DataStream 46,838 5,456 1,072 102 1,646 
 
Financial firms and 1990-
1995&2002  
27,580 3,183 844 84 1,299 
Annual Reports found 27,494 3,151 840 84 1,299 
 
Outliers 
 
27,350 
 
3,109 834 84 1,297 
Analyst i follows firm j at 
least for 3 years  
11,659 2,480 532 53 488 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 
This table exhibits the descriptive statistics for variables used in the study. See the description of the variables in 
Table A (N=11,659). 
 
Variables Min Max Mean Median St. Dev. 
Panel A: Forecast-specific characteristics 
ERROR, % 0.000 89.760 1.736 0.467 5.333 
DISPERSION, % 0.000 18.980 0.919 0.400 1.818 
BIAS, % -89.760 57.110 -0.321 0.044 5.599 
HORIZON 6.00 249.000 152.00 144.00 102.726 
NOREVIEW  1.000 19.000 2.820 2.000 1.785 
EXP 1.000 11.000 4.420 4.000 2.145 
EFF 0.010 1.000 0.086 0.043 0.141 
BRKSIZE 1.000 79.000 30.030 28.000 18.402 
Panel B: Firm-specific characteristics 
MRKCAP, (£M) 2,798 172,248 4,813 978 13,701 
ROASD 0.000 0.960 0.044 0.028 0.051 
GROWTH 0.000 31.620 1.104 1.035 0.739 
LOSS 0.000 1.000 0.051 0.000 0.220 
LEVERAGE 0.000 1.830 0.245 0.225 0.172 
Panel C: Board-specific characteristics 
SIZE OF THE BOARD 3.000 25.000 9.430 9.000 2.805 
NED 0.000 0.880 0.487 0.500 0.135 
DUALITY 0.000 1.000 0.080 0.001 0.264 
EXCHAIR 0.000 1.000 0.390 0.001 0.488 
NOMCOM 0.000 1.000 0.780 1.000 0.417 
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Table 3. The accuracy of analyst forecasts and board structure. 
 
This table compares the accuracy of individual analysts’ forecasts below and above the median value of the independent variables. For instance, the mean value of forecast error 
for firms with a proportion of non-executive directors below the median value (i.e., a low proportion of non-executive directors) is 1.386% compared to 2.043% for firms with a 
proportion of non-executive directors above the median (i.e., a high proportion of non-executive directors). For binary variables used in the study (duality, chairman mix and 
the existence of a nomination committee) the groups are formed based on the zero and unity values. Differences in mean are assessed using a t-test, while differences in median 
are evaluated using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (N=11,659).  
 
NED DUALITY EXCHAIR NOMCOM  
Variables Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median Mean  Median 
 ERROR 
 
        
Below the median or 0 
 
1.386 0.430 1.774 0.473 2.015 0.465 1.413 0.483 
 
Above the median or 1 
 
2.043 0.491 1.267 0.412 1.303 0.471 1.829 0.463 
Differences 
 
-0.657*** -0.061*** 0.508*** 0.061*** 0.712*** -0.006 -0.416*** 0.020 
 DISPERSION 
 
        
Below the median or 0 
 
0.864 0.345 0.925 0.402 0.982 0.415 0.877 0.313 
Above the median or 1 
 
0.967 0.447 0.848 0.354 0.821 0.361 0.931 0.413 
Differences 
 
-0.102*** -0.102*** 0.076 0.048*** 0.161*** 0.054*** -0.054 -0.100*** 
 BIAS 
 
        
Below the median or 0 
 
-0.387 0.052 -0.330 0.037 -0.192 0.068 -0.454 0.068 
Above the median or 1 
 
-0.263 0.034 -0.200 0.114 -0.521 0.009 0.282 0.037 
Differences 
 
-0.124 0.018 -0.130 -0.077*** 0.329*** 0.059*** -0.172 0.031** 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),* denotes significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 4.  Correlation table: ownership structure and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. 
 
 ERROR DISPER BIAS NED DUALITY EXCHAIR NOMCOM HORIZON NOREV LNMRK ROASD GROWTH LOSS LEVER EXP  EFF 
ERROR 1                
                  
DISPER 0.369(**) 1               
   0.000                
BIAS -0.092(**) -0.265(**) 1              
  0.000 0.000 .              
NED 0.053(**) 0.055(**) -0.001 1             
  0.000 0.000 0.875              
DUALITY -0.025(**) -0.011 0.006 -0.089(**) 1            
  0.007 0.231 0.508 0.000             
EXCHAIR -0.065(**) -0.043(**) -0.029(**) -0.241(**) 0.355(**) 1           
  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000            
NOMCOM 0.032(**) 0.012 0.013 0.168(**) -0.077(**) -0.100(**) 1          
  0.000 0.184 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.000           
HORIZON 0.048(**) -0.012 -0.075(**) -0.026(**) -0.006 -0.001 0.005 1         
  0.000 0.194 0.000 0.004 0.487 0.943 0.581          
NOREV 0.003 0.071(**) 0.021(*) 0.096(**) -0.032(**) -0.017 0.095(**) -0.368(**) 1        
  0.787 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.065 0.000 0.000         
LNMRK -0.086(**) -0.162(**) 0.024(*) 0.175(**) -0.081(**) 0.087(**) 0.315(**) -0.076(**) 0.160(**) 1       
  0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 .       
ROASD 0.132(**) 0.179(**) -0.069(**) 0.150(**) -0.027(**) -0.081(**) -0.070(**) 0.009 0.011 -0.109(**) 1      
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.344 0.255 0.000       
GROWTH 0.098(**) -0.050(**) 0.130(**) -0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.034(**) -0.023(*) -0.028(**) 0.089(**) 0.027(**) 1     
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.738 0.324 0.308 0.000 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.003      
LOSS 0.303(**) 0.227(**) -0.082(**) 0.102(**) 0.043(**) -0.033(**) -0.005 0.005 -0.006 -0.142(**) 0.382(**) -0.018(*) 1    
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.559 0.606 0.538 0.000 0.000 0.047     
LEVER -0.027(**) 0.044(**) -0.035(**) 0.189(**) -0.053(**) -0.034(**) 0.101(**) 0.025(**) 0.061(**) 0.126(**) 0.109(**) -0.025(**) 0.047(**) 1   
  0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000    
EXP  0.016 0.044(**) -0.029(**) 0.035(**) 0.005 -0.030(**) 0.080(**) 0.189(**) 0.078(**) -0.082(**) 0.038(**) -0.021(*) 0.043(**) 0.042(**) 1  
 0.075 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.609 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000   
EFF 0.003 0.016 -0.034(**) 0.114(**) -0.044(**) -0.015 0.071(**) 0.010 -0.050(**) 0.157(**) 0.028(**) -0.002 0.009 0.073(**) -0.086(**) 1 
 0.720 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.838 0.327 0.000 0.000  
BRKSIZE -0.007 -0.022(*) 0.012 0.046(**) 0.000 0.008 0.071(**) 0.045(**) 0.102(**) 0.131(**) -0.033(**) -0.013 -0.023(*) 0.061(**) -0.048(**) 0.037(**) 
 0.462 0.018 0.192 0.000 0.993 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5. Forecast error and board structure . 
 
The regression results for the pooled and Fama-MacBeth regressions presented in Table 5-7 are obtained by demeaning the independent variables by their respective analyst-firm means. The t-
statistics for analyst-firm fixed effects and pooled regressions (given in the second entry of each cell) are based on White’s (1980) estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. The t-statistics for 
Fama-MacBeth regressions are calculated as 
-
x /(sx/ n ) where the x’s are the regression coefficients for the individual year, sx is the standard deviation of the regression coefficients across the years, 
and n is the number of years (N=11,659). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
Expec
ted 
Analyst- 
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
NED - 2.977*** 
3.65 
2.977*** 
3.37 
3.120* 
1.68 
3.030*** 
3.50 
3.030*** 
3.17 
3.171 
1.57 
- - - - - - 
DUALITY + 0.191 
1.32 
0.191 
1.12 
-0.101 
-0.25 
0.351** 
2.29 
0.351** 
2.06 
0.320 
0.90 
- - - - - - 
EXCHAIR + - - - - - - -0.038 
-0.29 
-0.038 
-0.27 
-0.156 
-0.52 
0.054 
0.39 
0.054 
0.37 
0.111 
0.44 
NOMCOM - - - - - - - 0.068 
0.52 
0.068 
0.49 
0.213 
0.40 
0.056 
0.38 
0.056 
0.35 
0.165 
0.37 
LNMRKCAP - -1.462*** 
-8.34 
-1.462*** 
-6.79 
-1.972*** 
-2.77 
-1.224*** 
-8.18 
-1.224*** 
-5.49 
-1.671** 
-2.47 
-1.498*** 
-8.45 
-1.498*** 
-6.89 
-2.037*** 
-2.85 
-1.247*** 
-8.24 
-1.247*** 
-5.54 
-1.491* 
-1.91 
GROWTH + 0.566*** 
5.54 
0.566*** 
1.98 
0.504 
0.62 
- - - 0.577*** 
5.58 
0.577*** 
2.02 
0.535 
0.65 
- - - 
LOSS + 4.774*** 
7.32 
4.774*** 
5.37 
4.759* 
1.84 
- - - 4.809*** 
7.36 
4.809*** 
5.40 
4.778* 
1.83 
- - - 
LEVERAGE - -1.470*** 
-2.97 
-1.470*** 
-2.53 
-0.907 
-0.44 
- - - -1.425*** 
-2.89 
-1.425*** 
-2.47 
-1.963 
-1.01 
- - - 
ROASD + - - - 14.186*** 
4.46 
14.186*** 
4.00 
9.066 
1.31 
- - - 14.458*** 
4.52 
14.458*** 
4.06 
9.804 
1.41 
HORIZON + 0.003*** 
7.52 
0.003*** 
5.93 
0.004*** 
4.39 
- - - 0.004*** 
7.71 
0.004*** 
6.07 
0.004*** 
3.66 
- - - 
NOREVIEW  - - - - -0.033 
-1.17 
-0.033 
-0.93 
-0.032 
-0.84 
- - - -0.032 
-1.13 
-0.032 
-0.89 
-0.033 
-0.78 
EXP - - - - 0.081*** 
2.76 
0.081*** 
2.10 
0.332** 
2.67 
- - - 0.115*** 
3.49 
0.115*** 
2.78 
0.358*** 
3.22 
EFF - - - - 0.840 
1.21 
0.840 
1.10 
1.162* 
1.68 
- - - 0.808 
1.16 
0.808 
1.06 
1.031 
1.47 
BRKSIZE - - - - 0.003 
0.79 
0.003 
0.55 
0.002 
0.326 
- - - 0.003 
0.80 
0.003 
0.55 
0.002 
0.23 
R-Sq.,%  62.07 3.87  59.82 1.63  61.97 3.77  59.72 1.52  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),* denotes significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 6. Dispersion and board structure . 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
Expec
ted 
Analyst- 
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
NED - 1.035*** 
2.81 
1.035*** 
2.57 
0.599 
1.06 
0.513 
1.31 
0.513 
1.19 
0.565 
1.08 
- - - - - - 
DUALITY + -0.221** 
-2.23 
-0.221** 
-2.02 
-0.270 
-0.91 
-0.147 
-1.47 
-0.147 
-1.34 
-0.224 
-0.77 
- - - - - - 
EXCHAIR + - - - - -  -0.216*** 
-2.91 
-0.216*** 
-2.82 
-0.156 
-0.68 
-0.134* 
-1.71 
-0.134* 
-1.68 
-0.137 
-0.60 
NOMCOM - - - - - -  0.125** 
2.38 
0.125** 
2.09 
-0.064 
-0.39 
-0.042 
-0.76 
-0.042 
-0.69 
-0.097 
-0.73 
LNMRKCAP - -0.942*** 
-11.10 
-0.942*** 
-11.11 
-1.067*** 
3.64 
-0.787*** 
-11.54 
-0.787*** 
-11.04 
-0.863*** 
-4.38 
-0.952*** 
-11.13 
-0.952*** 
-11.12 
-1.073*** 
-3.65 
-0.788*** 
-11.49 
-0.788*** 
-10.96 
-0.860*** 
4.40 
GROWTH + 0.209*** 
5.55 
0.209*** 
5.79 
0.324*** 
1.89 
- -  0.214*** 
5.60 
0.214*** 
5.85 
0.331** 
1.94 
- - - 
LOSS + 0.686*** 
5.16 
0.686*** 
4.49 
0.750 
1.51 
- -  0.867*** 
5.10 
0.867*** 
4.44 
0.756 
1.51 
- - - 
LEVERAGE + 0.682*** 
3.62 
0.682*** 
2.89 
0.011 
0.02 
- -  0.666*** 
3.47 
0.666*** 
2.78 
0.067 
0.12 
- - - 
ROASD + - - - 6.721*** 
7.83 
6.721*** 
6.30 
5.685*** 
2.47 
- - - 6.807*** 
7.85 
6.807*** 
6.34 
5.686** 
2.40 
HORIZON + -0.001 
-0.24 
-0.001 
-0.21 
-0.001 
-0.79 
- -  -0.001 
-0.21 
-0.001 
-0.19 
-0.001 
0.79 
- - - 
NOREVIEW  - - - - 0.060*** 
4.92 
0.060*** 
4.41 
0.054*** 
4.92 
- - - 0.060*** 
4.92 
0.060*** 
4.41 
0.052*** 
4.90 
EXP ? - - - 0.076*** 
5.93 
0.076*** 
5.55 
0.019 
1.20 
- - - 0.081*** 
5.99 
0.081*** 
5.98 
0.032 
1.50 
EFF - - - - 0.189 
0.97 
0.189 
0.88 
0.293 
1.11 
- - - 0.180 
0.92 
0.180 
0.84 
0.269 
1.02 
BRKSIZE ? - - - -0.001 
-0.37 
-0.001 
-0.33 
0.001 
0.67 
- - - -0.001 
-0.37 
-0.001 
-0.33 
0.001 
0.77 
R-Sq.,%  40.86 4.60  41.09 4.84  40.83 4.57  41.09 4.83  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),* denotes significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 7. Forecast bias and board structure . 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   
Expec
ted 
Analyst- 
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-
firm FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth 
Analyst-firm 
FE 
Pooled  
regressions 
Fama- 
MacBeth
NED - -3.876*** 
-4.40 
-3.876*** 
-4.07 
-3.126 
-1.88 
-3.832*** 
-4.16 
-3.832*** 
-3.79 
-3.900** 
-2.29 
- -  - - - 
DUALITY + -0.303* 
-1.69 
-0.303* 
-1.73 
-0.311 
-0.54 
-0.386** 
-2.07 
-0.386** 
-2.19 
-0.399 
-1.12 
- -  - - - 
EXCHAIR + - - - - -  0.272* 
1.87 
0.272* 
1.77 
0.223 
0.59 
0.189 
1.21 
0.189 
1.16 
0.242 
0.60 
NOMCOM - - - - - -  -0.011 
-0.07 
-0.011 
-0.07 
0.394 
0.83 
0.006 
0.04 
0.006 
0.04 
-0.119 
-0.30 
LNMRKCAP + 0.998*** 
6.48 
0.998*** 
4.72 
1.418** 
1.68 
0.995*** 
6.89 
0.995*** 
4.42 
1.133 
1.03 
1.043*** 
6.65 
1.043*** 
4.87 
0.969 
0.99 
1.019*** 
6.97 
1.019*** 
4.49 
 
GROWTH - -0.181** 
-2.09 
-0.181** 
-0.56 
-0.724 
-0.98 
- -  -0.196** 
-2.22 
-0.196** 
-0.60 
-0.768 
-1.04 
- - 1.137 
1.02 
LOSS - -3.493*** 
-5.12 
-3.493*** 
-3.77 
-2.551 
-0.77 
- -  -3.547*** 
-5.17 
-3.547*** 
-3.82 
-2.14 
-0.79 
   
LEVERAGE ? 1.785*** 
3.38 
1.785*** 
2.87 
2.625** 
1.63 
- -  1.747*** 
3.32 
1.747*** 
2.82 
2.699* 
1.63 
- -  
ROASD - - - - -9.964*** 
-3.01 
-9.964*** 
-2.66 
-7.121 
-1.13 
- - - -10.431*** 
-3.13 
-10.431*** 
-3.13 
-7.467 
-1.18 
HORIZON - -0.004*** 
-8.35 
-0.004*** 
-6.56 
-0.003*** 
-2.53 
- -  -0.004*** 
-8.56 
-0.004*** 
-6.72 
-0.001*** 
-2.71 
- -  
NOREVIEW  + - - - 0.071** 
2.43 
0.071** 
1.90 
0.042 
1.42 
- - - 0.070** 
2.38 
0.070** 
1.86 
0.033 
1.12 
EXP - - - - -0.091*** 
-2.86 
-0.091*** 
-2.22 
0.374*** 
3.16 
- - - -0.128*** 
-3.63 
-0.128*** 
-2.93 
0.334* 
2.76 
EFF - - - - -0.399 
-0.55 
-0.399 
-0.50 
-0.360 
-0.43 
- - - -0.349 
-0.48 
-0.349 
-0.43 
-0.228 
-0.27 
BRKSIZE ? - - - -0.009* 
-1.88 
-0.009* 
-1.30 
-0.003 
-0.52 
- - - -0.009* 
-1.87 
-0.009 
-1.30 
-0.003 
-0.62 
R-Sq.,%  61.06 2.27  59.89 1.11  60.92 2.12  59.75 0.96  
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),* denotes significance at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 8. Sensitivity tests . 
 
This table exhibits the results of sensitivity tests in relation to the ownership of insider members of the board and research and 
development expenditures using Model 1 and an analyst-firm fixed effects estimator. DINSOW represents a dummy variable that 
takes a value of unity if the proportion of shares held by insider members of the board as a proportion of outstanding shares for 
firm j in year t is greater than the median in the sample , and zero otherwise. DR&DH is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
unity if the proportion of research and development expenditures in total sales of firm j in year t is greater than the median, and 
zero otherwise. DR&DL is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the proportion of research and development 
expenditures in total sales of firm j in year t is lower than the median, and zero otherwise. In both cases, the median of research 
and development expenditures as a proportion of total sales is calculated using the sample of firms that report positive (non-zero) 
research and development expenditures. See Table A for a description of the remaining variables (N=11,659). 
Insider Ownership Research and Development Expenditures  
Error Dispersion Bias Error Dispersion Bias 
NED 3.436*** 
4.09 
1.301*** 
3.44 
-4.199*** 
-4.64 
2.818*** 
2.98 
0.300 
0.67 
-4.230*** 
-4.14 
NED*DINSOW -1.320*** 
-2.91 
-0.763*** 
-5.32 
0.928* 
1.94 
- - - 
NED*DR&DH - - - 2.853** 
2.22 
3.001*** 
4.52 
-1.154 
-0.86 
NED*DR&DL - - - -1.401* 
-1.81 
1.243*** 
3.05 
2.564*** 
3.12 
DUALITY 0.264* 
1.81 
-0.178* 
-1.78 
-0.354** 
-1.96 
0.165 
1.15 
-0.211** 
-2.17 
-0.264 
-1.47 
HORIZON 0.003*** 
7.53 
-0.001 
-0.23 
-0.004*** 
-8.35 
0.003*** 
7.52 
-0.001 
-0.51 
-0.004*** 
-8.42 
LNMRKCAP -1.451*** 
-8.34 
-0.935*** 
-11.11 
0.991*** 
6.46 
-1.436*** 
-8.30 
-0.923*** 
-10.85 
0.982*** 
6.48 
GROWTH 0.565*** 
5.56 
0.209*** 
5.57 
-0.180** 
-2.08 
0.552*** 
5.51 
0.203*** 
5.49 
-0.169** 
-1.99 
LOSS 4.810*** 
7.36 
0.889*** 
5.30 
-3.518*** 
-5.12 
4.803*** 
7.37 
0.866*** 
5.11 
-3.529*** 
-5.16 
LEVERAGE -1.556*** 
-3.12 
0.632*** 
3.34 
1.846*** 
3.47 
-1.435*** 
-2.94 
0.620*** 
3.25 
1.698*** 
3.24 
R-Sq.,% 62.14 41.07 61.10 62.25 41.41 61.20 
*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), ** denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed),* denotes significance at the 0.1 level (2-
tailed) 
 
